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ABSTRACT
Puzzling results of a positive association between the
number of physicians per capita and the level of fees for physician
services have been reported in the literature. These results may be
due to misspecification of econometric models and use of data aggre-
gated across medical specialties. It is hypothesized that the
unusual results would not persist with a carefully specified econo-
metric model for a single medical specialty. A general model of
pricing and location of physician's services is applied to the market
for psychiatrist's services. The results imply that the market for
psychiatrist's services operates in a manner consistent with the
predictions of the competitive model.
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Economic theory begins with the assumption that buyers will demand less of
a good, and sellers will supply more, as price increases. Given these behav-
ioral assumptions, if there is an increase in the number of sellers inthe
market, more will be supplied at any price, causing the market clearingprice
to fall. This leads economic theory to predict that, in the market forphysi-
cian services, ceterus paribus, price willvary inversely with the number of
physicians avaliable.
Econometric studies of physician pricing and location decisions, however,
have repeatedly shown that a higher physician—to—population ratio isassociated
with higher, rather than lower, fees. The results of such studies have led
economists to abandon traditional assumptions about the manner in which markets
for physicians' services function. It has in fact been posited thatphysicians
may be able to create their own demand or that they price in such a way as to
maintain a target level of income.In the light of such information, many
policymakers have begun to rethink the wisdom" of increasing the number of
physicians as a policy for decreasing the cost of medical care. Several
government officials have even recommended that the number of places in medical
schools be limited in order to lower fees for physician services.
In the research discussed in this paper, we examined the pricing and
location of private psychiatric services in a market model in which thesupply
of providers was allowed to adjust slowly to changes in demand. One of the
primary advantages of selecting psychiatry is the relatively homogeneous nature
of mental health services. In addition, psychiatristsare one of the few
specialists subject to meaningful competition from non-medical providers.
Methodological Issues in Studies of Physician Fee Setting
The studies of Newhouse (1980) and Feldstein (1970) were the first serious
attempts to test models of physician fee determination empirically. In both it2
was found that increasing the physician—to-population ratio wouldresult in
increased fee levels, ceterus paribus. These studieswere critized on
empirical and theoretical grounds, and their results led toone of the most
heated controversies in health economics.However, subsequent investigations
obtained similar findings (see Fuchs and Kramer1972, Dyckman 1978 and Fuchs
1978).
Over the past ten years, analysis of the theoreticalmodels proposed to
reconcile the empirical findings of these studies withpredictions of economic
theory led to questions about the existing methods ofmodeling fee deterinina—
tion in the physicians' services market. Mostempirical studies of physician
fees are based on market models in which short-runequilibrium is presumed to
exist. The predictions of the neo-classical modelare then tested according to
how well parameter estimates coincide withtraditional assumptions. A number
of studies have attempted such tests. Threemajor points regarding estimation
of such models have emerged from the literature.
First, data should be disaggregated by medical specialty.2 Dataaggre-
gated across specialties may indicate a relationship betweenthe average fee
level and the physician—to-populatjon ratio thatis spurious. Differences in
average fees between locations when aggregated across specialtiesmay not
result from differences in the model'sexplanatory variables but rather from
the specialty mix.3
In addition, it is likely that there existinterrelationships between
medical specialties. While it is probable thata number of specialties compete
(i.e., for patients), it may be that somespecialties act as complements to
others. This also may produce a spurious correlationbetween the average fee
and the physician—to—population ratio. Forinstance, increasing the number of
general practitioners may lead to lower fees for theservices of general3
practitioners but also to increased demand for theservices of internists,
which will exert upward pressureon their fees.
Aggregation across specialties may lead to difficulties inthe interpre-
tation of empirical results also becauseinput time of the physician varies
between specialties. For example, a visit tothe office of a general practi-
tioner for a routine physical examination ofteninvolves rather extensive use
of a nurse's time and relatively littleuse of physician time. A visit to the
office of a psychiatrist for psychotherapyinvolves, almost exclusively
psychiatrist time. Fee or quantity variables basedupon aggregate data will
vary considerably, depending on the procedure mix in eachlocality.
A second empirical issue whichemerges from the literature is that the
physician_to_population ratio may be endogenous to the short-runfee-setting
model ,andthe treatment of the physician stockas exogenous may lead to biased
and inconsistent parameter estimates,. Difficultiesassociated with fully
specifying the demand equation in the physician services marketmay lead to
specification error. Thus, the inclusion of a long-run locationmodel within a
model of physician pricing may minimize the chancethat biased parameter
estimates of the relationship will occur between thephysician_to—population
ratio and the level of fees.
Problems of misspecificatjon inconstructing empirical tests in models of
physician fee setting have plagued earlier studies.Reirihardt (1978) takes a
dim view of criticism of studies which haveobtained results inconsistent with
traditional predictions of the competitive model dueto misspecifjcatjon. He
suggests that any study is vulnerable to such accusations, andsuch criticism
can always be levied at an attempt to reject thecompetitive model's predic-
tions in the physician services market. While thereis considerable truth in
Reinhardt's position, the concerns with misspecificatjonare not limited to4
trivial omissions of obscure variables.4 To a large extent, specification
problems may be the very basis for puzzling empirical results.
These methodological pitfalls (aggregated data, treatment of physician
stock as exogenous, and specification error) make it difficult to interpret the
empirical results on physician fee determination reported in the literature.
Differentiating between the competitive model and alternatives such as the
model of physician-induced demand is difficult on theoretical grounds.
Reinhardt (1978) and Sloan & Feldman (1978) point out that both physician—
induced-demand and competitive models can yield predictions that are consistent
with all empirical estimates of the relation between thephysician-to-popula-
tion ratio and the fee level. They show, however, that a negativerelationship
suggests that competitive forces are dominant. In neither case can one model
be unambiguously rejected. Even a limited test of the competitive model
requires that a carefully specified model of physician fees be applied to a
single medical specialty.
A Model of Pricing and Location of Psychiatrists' Services
No definitive test on the nature of market structures for the physician
services market has yet been developed. In addition, empirical results from
econometric models do not clearly support one formulation of market structure
over others. In this study of the market for psychiatrist's services, we began
by using the competitive model as the starting point. We assumed that the
individual psychiatrist is a price taker. From this assumption,we derived a
market supply function
(1) QS =QS(PQ,PS,X)
where Qs is the quantity, of services supplied to the market
Po is the psychiatrists own fee for a unit of service
X is a vector of variables representing the psychiatrist'scost function
PS is the psychiatrist-to-population ratio5
The specific shape of the supply function given in equation (1) isan
empirical question. Feldstein's (1970) finding that the supply curve had a
negative price elasticity might mean that the supply curve for physician
services with respect to fees is backward bending. We do not rule out this
possibility.
The demand function is assumed to be a traditional negatively inclined
function with respect to fee. It is important to recognizeexplicitly the
existence of other medical and nonmedical providers of psychotherapy and the
effect of their actions on the market for psychiatrists' services; forexample,
McGuire (1980) points out that the effect of psychologists on the market for
psychiatrists' services may be of particular importance. Thus, we enter the
cross-price effects of other providers of psychotherapy into our demand
equation, allowing for a test of some of the less obvious relationsamong
providers where our theory does not make clear predictions.5 It has been
hypothesized, for example, that the cross-price elasticity of an increase in
psychologists' fees on the demand for psychiatrists' services will be positive,
i.e., that psychiatrists and psychologists are substitutes in demand. The
extent to which general practitioners and internists are substitutes for
psychiatrists in that they provide similar services or complements, in that
they provide referrals, is not clear.6
Another important issue in the demand function specification is themanner
in which insurance coverage is treated. The literaturetypically assumes that
insurance simply shifts the demand curve in some fashion, and thata standard
short-run supply curve exists. Thus prices respond to the shift in demand in
such a way as to establish a new short-run equilibrium.Representing insurance
intermsof the total value of health insurance benefits paid or the number
individuals with some insurance coverage in a particular geographicarea
describes only one dimension of the effect of insurancecoverage. It is6
important to establish how much coverage exists and for which medical proce-
dures
Coverage for mental disorders under major medical plans may be character-
ized as significantly less extensive than coverage for physical ailments.1
Thus, specification of the effect of insurance on the demand for psychiatric
services must be more complex than what can be measured by merely including a
single—demand shift variable. A number of state legislatures have responded to
the paucity of insurance coverage for mental disorders by requiring insurance
companies to offer mental health coverage as part of their basic benefit
packages (McGure and Montgomery 1982); the guidelines set up by the states
vary widely in the breadth of coverage they require insurers to offer. Since
this study focuses on the market for psychiatrists' services delivered in their
offices, a variable describing whether each state has mandated a minimum level
of outpatient mental health coverage of $500 will be included in our demand
function specification. In this manner we will be able to estimate the effect
of general, as well as specifically psychiatric, insurance on the demand for
psychiatrists' services. A significant limitation of this specification is
that the marginal price of services to the population is not measured directly.
Instead, we use aggregate measures of the amount of coverage existing within
the population. Newhouse, Phelps and Marquis (1980) discuss this problem in
considerable detail.8 With these specific issues in mind, then, the demand
function can be expressed as follows:
(2) Qd =Qd(P0, m' nm' ''I,K)
where Qd =Themarket demand for psychiatrists' services
P0 Fees for psychiatrists' services
=Feesof medical providers
=Feesfor nonmedical providers7
V =Meanpopulation income in the market
I =Insurancevariables
K =Vectorof demand shift variables
The physician—induced demand model and the target income model raise
serious challenges to the standard neoclassical modelpresented thus far.
Because the ability to create demand is unobservable, as is thetarget income,
most empirical tests of these models are indirect.9 The test used most often
in the past has been the estimation of the coefficientcorresponding to the
psychiatrist-to-population ratio in the supply function. If the SUiy and
demand curves have their usual shapes, then a positive coefficient willbe
consistent with the traditional model as well as with the inducementmodel; the
result will reject the prediction of the traditional model if the coefficient
is negative. In this study we test the competitive modelby inclusion of the
psychiatrist—to-population ratio.
A second test of competitive forces (used in this study) involves the
location decisions of psychiatrists. If the ability to create demandcan
significantly insulate a psychiatrist from market forces, then one wouldexpect
little responsiveness on the part of psychiatrists to distribute themselves
geographically, according to demand. If, on the other hand, psychiatrists do
respond to market forces, one might expect the opposite. The significance of
specifying a model of physician location as part of the price determination
model extends beyond statistical considerations: embeddinga location model
offers a theoretically derived test of competing models ofphysician behavior'°
Since psychiatrists' fees, quantity of services supplied, and thepsy-
chiatrist stock may he jointly determined, a model of psychiatristlocation in
this Study is integrated with a short-run market model ofpsychiatrist behav-
ior. The stock of psychiatrists may adjust slowly overtime; this possibility
is explicitly recognized and specified as part of the econometricmodel.8
Psychiatrists are assumed to be utility maximizers andto locate in areas
that offer the greatest combination ofpersonal and professional advantages.
The individual psychiatrist maximizesa utility function which has income,
workload, and the quality of life as arguments. If there isfree entry into
local markets, the long-run equilibrium wouldimply equal levels of utility
across all locations, i.e., each location will offeran entering psychiatrist a
combination of monetary and nonmonetaryadvantages that are equivalent.
In long-run equilibrium, the stock ofpsychiatrists may then be expressed
in the following fashion:
(3) Psi =f(P,Z )
wherePS —isthe psychiatrist stock at the th location
P —isthe fee for 1 unit of psychiatrists' services
Z -isa vector of locational characteristics
The stock of psychiatrists may not adjustimmediately. Psychiatrists in
private practice sell their services directly to thepublic and must therefore
invest considerable resources inestablishing goodwill. Therefore, finding new
patients and gaining their trust and confidence ina new market may involve
significant costs. In addition, there exist financialimpediments to mobility
in the form of sizable investments in
establishing an office; these costs must
be contrasted with the advantages offeredat other locations. The decision
rule for the utility—maximizing psychiatrist isthat he or she will move if the
utility offered by other locations is greater than thecosts of moving, ceterus
paribus, and migration will occur until no net gains frommigration can be
realized. Under these circumstances, the rate ofadjustment of the psychia-
trist stock depends on the cost of moving relativeto the benefits arising from
disequilibrium. The rate of adjustment to disequilibrium inthe market can be
described by a lagged adjustment modelas described by Griliches (1967):9
(A\flC' tiC1 —(tie'1 tie' I)- rJtlXrj-rJtl
where X is the coefficient of adjustment
PSi is the equilibrium stock of psychiatrists
PSI is the actual stock of psychiatrists
Equation (4) describes the rate of adjustment in one time period of the actual
level of the psychiatrist stock to the desired or equilibrium level. By
substituting equation (3) into equation (4), the stock of psychiatrists can be
expressed in a form that can be incorporated into an econometric model. The
location equation will be of the form:
(5) PS: =x(f(P, Z)) +(1_Xp51
Estimation of will allow for the empirical identification of the rate of
adjustment of the psychiatrist stock to long-run disequilibrium. An estimate
of X close to zero indicates little responsiveness to market forces, which
would provide support for the inducement model, whereas an estimate sub-
stantially greater than zero would indicate responsiveness to market pressures
and would be consistent with the competitive model .Thusfar, a 3-equation
model of the psychiatrists' services market has been developed, based on the
assumptions of the competitive model (equations 1, 2, and 5).
Specification and Estimation
The general functional form of the 3-equation model is a hybrid of the
log—linear and linear. Monetary variables such as prices, incomes, and insur-
ance benefits are specified in the usual log linear form, while variables
describing the socio-demographic characteristics are entered in linear form.
In the present study, the structural model was estimated using pooled time
series and cross-section data. The data on 50 states for a number of years
were pooled to make up the data set. Combining time series and cross-section
data made estimation more difficult than with either time-series or cross-
section data individually. The least square dummy variables (LSDV) approach to
estimation was used (see Mundlak 1978) in this study because there is reason to10
believe that there may be non-zero correlations between the time-series and
cross-section effects and the independent variables. To retain degrees of
freedom, the model was estimated using cross-sectional dummy variables
representing geographic regions of the country rather than individual states.
An F test was used to compare estimates using regional dummies, to those
obtained from using state dummy variables. The model was estimated by three
stage least squares (3SLS).
Data and Variable Definitions
The data used to estimate the model of the market for psychiatrists1
services are a cross section of time series of the 50 states of the United
States. Data from several sources were merged in order to assemble this data
set. Variables included in the study and the sources from which they were
collected are reported in Table 1. The data set, which consisted of a time
series of cross sections (states) for the years 1970 to 1978 was subdivided
into two smaller data sets because several critical variables were unavailable
for some years. Data on psychiatrists1 fees were available for the years 1970,
1971, 1973, 1977, and 1978. Allowing for the construction of two data sets.
One was based on five years of data which contained 250 cases; the other was
based on three years of data, which resulted in a data set of 150 cases. Mean
and standard deviations for selected variables are present in Table 2. A
detailed description of the data can be obtained from the author.
Two versions of the structural model described above are estimted below.
Model I is estimated for three years of data across 50 states. The fee data for
each of these three years is based on observations from within each state,
aggregated to obtain a state-wide average fee.Fee data for these years are
also available on visits to the office of general practitioners and internists.
Thus data allowed for estimation of explicitly cross-price elasticities between
medical providers.11
Model II is based on five years of data across 50 states. Two years (1970
and 1971) of fee data are based on averages for the geographic region in which
the state is located. Fee data for other medical providers are not available.
Therefore, a variable representing the number of non—psychiatrist physicians
per capita (MDPOP) is entered into the demand equation in place of the fees for
internists and general practitioners.11
Demand Equation Estimates
The estimates of Structural Models I and II are reported in Table 3•12
Since the endogenous variables FEE and PLVIS, as well as all monetary-indepen-
dent variables, are in log form, estimates of those parameters can be inter-
preted as elasticities.
The estimated own price elasticities of demand (LFEE) are both negative
and significantly different from zero. The values of the estimated elastici-
ties for the two models differ substantially (according to a t-test).13 Model
I (—0.918), and Model II reported an estimate of (-2.199). These estimates are
significantly different from one another using a t test. A previous estimate
(McGuire 1981) of the price elasticity of demand for psychiatrists' services,
based on survey data using individuals as the unit of observation, obtained
estimates for the effects on the quantity demanded for changes in coinsurance.
McGuire's "conservative" estimate of the total effect on demand of a fall in
the marginal fee paid by the consumer was (—1.00), closer to our Model I
estimate. Our estimates may differ, due to the fact that the variables which
represent the influence of other providers are not equally measured in the two
model s.
The cross-price elasticities of demand in Model I (LPIN and LGP) were
estimated to be (-0.665) and (0.485), respectively. The estimate for the
cross-price elasticity of demand for the price of internists' services (LPIN)
was significantly different from zero at the (0.10) level. The negative sign12
indicatingthat internists are complements in demands means that as fees of
internists increase, ceterus paribus, the demand for psychiatrists' services
will decline. Such a finding suggests that internists may be a source of
referrals to psychiatrists. The magnitude of the coefficient (-0.665) implies
that a 1 percent increase in fees of internists will lead to a .6 of one
percent decrease in the demand for psychiatrists' services, considerably larger
than what was expected: most estimates of own price elasticities for primary
care physicians have been about 0.30. This may, in part, reflect the impre-
cision of the estimates. The sign of the coefficient, however, provides
evidence of complementarity.
The coefficient representing the cross-price elasticity of demand for psy-
chiatrists' services with respect to general practitioners was estimated to be
(0.485). This cross-price elasticity was only significant at the (0.10)
level.The positive coefficient would indicate that the two services are
substitutes; a 1 percent increase in the fees of general practitioners will
leadto a .485 of 1 percent increase in the quantity of psychiatrists' services
demanded. Given the rather large volume of psychiatric patients seen by
general practitioners (GP's), it is not surprising to find that a considerable
amount of substitution may occur between the services of GP's and psychi-
atrists.14 Again, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger than expected.
The size of standard error indicates a lack of precision in the estimate.
The variable REMB takes on a value of 1 for states that have enacted
legislation requiring direct recognition of psychologists as independent health
careproviders by third party payors, and zero for states that have not. This
variablerepresents the cross—price effect of psychologists' services on the
demand for psychiatrists' services. The estimated coefficient for REMB was
(-0.138) for Model I and (-0.168) for Model II. Both these estimates were
significant at the 0.10 level; once again, the rather low level of significance13
means that the interpretations of the coefficients must be made witha good
deal of caution. Both coefficients are negative, whichcan be interpreted as
suggesting that psychologists' services are substitutes in demand for those of
psychiatrists. The estimated coefficient for REMB indicates the differencein
the number of visits made to psychiatrists between states that havediffering
policies vis a vis reimbursement of psychologists. Since thedependent
variable in the demand equation is measured as the log visits topsychiatrists
per capita, the estimated coefficients of -0.138 and -0.168 imply that states
that require direct recognition of psychologists as healthcare providers by
third party payors have between 14 and 16.8 percent fewer visitsper capita to
psychiatrists, all things equal, than states that do not require direct
recognition. These estimates provide some evidence that psychiatrists' and
psychologists' services are important substitutes in demand.
The estimated coefficient for LINS was 0.057 for Model I and 0.115for
Model II; neither estimate was significantly different fromzero. The estimated
coefficient of the variable 0U15 was estimated to be 0.222 for Model Iand
0.119 for Model II; both were significant at the 0.10 level. Theseestimates
imply that in states where insurance plans must offer 500 dollars ofoutpatient
mental health benefits, demand for psychiatrists' services will besignifi-
cantly greater than in states without such mandates (McGuire andMontgomery
1982). Thus, it is likely that expansion of outpatientcoverage for mental
disorders would expand the demand for psychiatrists' servicessubstantially.
OUT5 and the own price elasticity of demand bothmeasure aspects of the
responsiveness of consumers to the out-of-pocket price for mental health
service. OUT5 also measures the extent of outpatient insurance benefitsfor
the treatment of mental disorders, and LFEE thegross price of psychiatrists'
services. It was expected that the coefficient estimates for thetwo variables14
would be consistent with each other; i.e., when fees for psychiatric services
are lowered, consumers are very responsive in their consumption of more
psychiatric services. This expectation was borne out by our results.
Supply Equation Results
The own price elasticity of supply (LFEE) was estimated to be 0.127 in
Model I and 0.233 in Model II. Model I's estimate was significant at the
(0.10) level and Model Ii's estimates at the (0.05) level.The supply
function is rather inelastic in the short-run, whichmay be expected if psy-
chiatrists relocated slowly. The results are consistent with the fact that
psychiatry is time—intensive for the psychiatrist, and since the basic unit of
service is the 50-minute psychotherapy visit, the possibilities forexpanding
output by input substitution are quite limited.
Perhaps the most controversial findings in the literature have focused on
the reaction of the market to an increase in the stock of physicians(psychi-
atrists, in this case). The estimated coefficients for the variable LPSP in
the supply equations were 0.962 for Model I and 0.964 for Model II, and both
were significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. This result means
that increasing the stock of psychiatrists in a state by onepercent will
increase the quantity of services by about .96 of one percent15 and iscon-
sistent with the predictions of the competitive model. That is,an increase in
the number of providers per capita should shift the supplycurve to the right,
thereby increasing the quantity supplied at each fEe level. These estimates
are stable across the two models, and the standard errors are small. When the
coefficient LPSP is included in a partial reduced form equation with LFEEas
the left-hand side variable, the estimated coefficient is negative.Moreover,
the simple correlation between LFEE and LPSP was 0.113, suggesting thatour
approach to model specification removes the observed positive correlation15
between physician fees arid the physician stock. These resultsindicate
behavior in the market for psychiatrists' services that is inline with the
competitive model.
Psychiatrist Stock Equation Results
The stock equation, unlike the demand equation, has thesame specification
in both models. The use of proxy variables was notnecessary for the larger
data set. Therefore, the increased sample size made forstatistically more
robust estimates. Table 4 reports the long—run elasticities ofselected
variables from the location equation. 16
Perhaps the most surprising result from the psychiatrist stockequation is
the contradictory and statistically insignificant resultsassociated with the
fee variable indicating market conditions. Coefficientswere estimated to be
-0.625 for Model I and 0.163 for Model II.In neither case were the estimates
significantly different from zero. As was mentioned earlier, thelonger time
frame of Model II makes us slightly more confident of thoseresults. The
estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in fee would lead toeither a 6.2
percent decrease in the psychiatrist stock or a 1.7 percent increase. The
negative sign on Model I's coefficient is rather implausible; thus,we are more
inclined to accept Model II's estimate. Both results dosuggest that price as
measured by LFEE is not an important determinant of the currentdistribution of
the stock of psychiatrists across locations.
The variable LYP, which represents theper capita level of income in each
state, was found to be significantly related to the stock of psychiatrists
across states. The estimated long-run elasticity for LYP was 1.18 forModel I
and 0.850 for Model II. Model tI's elasticitywas derived from an estimate
that was significant at the 0.05 level; Model I's estimatewas significant at
the 0.05 level. Thus an increase in per-capita income of 10percent will
increase the stock of psychiatrists by between 8.5 and 10.1percent. These16
results are similar to those reported by Benham et al. (1968), whoconcluded
that physicians tend to locate in high income areas because of thegreater
purchasing power in those markets. This finding to some extent contrasts with
the LFEE results. The LFEE variables should summarize thesupply and demand
conditions of the market, and therefore differences in purchasingpower should
be reflected in market price. An alternative interpretation is thatthe income
variable LYP represents some aspects of the quality of life ina state, e.g.,
the type of people one will have as neighbors and the distractionsthat will be
present for the high-income professional. This interpretation of the LYP
coefficient runs counter to the simple competitive model andsays, in essence,
that psychiatrists will choose location on the basis of non—economicfactors.
The estimated coefficient on the psychiatrist-to-population ratiolagged
one period can be used to calculate the rate of adjustment in thepsychiatrist
stock over time. The estimated coefficients were 0.792 for Model Iand 0.598
for Model II. Both estimates were significantly different fromzero at the
0.05 level. The adjustment coefficient can be expressed interms of the
estimated coefficient in the following manner:
A =
Ourestimate for A in Model I is 0.196 and for Model II, 0.402. Thismeans
that from 20—40% of the gap between the long—run equilibrium leveland the
actual level of the psychiatrist stock will he filled inany single year. The
stock of psychiatrists, therefore, appears to adjust ratherslowly.
Concl usions
The most important conclusion of this study is that themarket for
psychiatrists' services appears to respond to the forces ofcompetition to an
extent greater than previously thought. Competitivepressures appear to effect17
the demand and supply functions inways that are consistent with the competi -
tivemodel. In particular, increasing the stock ofpsychiatrists shifts the
supply function rightward along a downward sloping demandfunction, which leads
to lower fees for the services of psychiatrists.This finding takes on
particular significance when it is viewed in the context ofcomments by federal
policy makers who advocate decreasing the stock of physiciansas a means of
lowering fees.
Sincethe structural model coefficient estimates of thephysician-to-
population ratio in supply and reduced-form equations do notserve to dif-
ferentiate unambiguously the competitive model fromcompeting models, one must
rely upon indirect tests. The indirect test is basedon the responsiveness of
the stock of psychiatrists' to market conditions(our Xcoefficient).Evidence
from the indirect tests performed in ouranalysis suggests that psychiatrists
do react to long—run spatial disequilibrium, albeitslowly. That is, in any
one year, psychiatrists move so as to fill approximately 20 to 40percent of
the gap between the desired level of the long—runequilibrium stock of psychia-
trists and the actual stock. Thus, psychiatristsare not insulated from market
forces; instead, they may he utility maximizers facing significantmoving
costs, which makes the adjustment occur slowly.
The estimates of the effects of other medicalspecialities on the demand
for psychiatrists' services illustrates the importance ofdisaggregating data
regarding physician visits and fees by specialty. The existence of both
complementary and substitute relationships between psychiatrists,internists,
and general practitioners indicates thatpuzzling results reported by studies
of physician pricing using aggregate datamay have, at least in part, been the
result of interrelationships among specialities.18
We recognize that while there are significant differences between the
circumstances facing the specialty of psychiatry and other medical specialties,
there are important similarities that make our findings suggestive of ap-
proachesby which to study and interpret of pricing and location of physician
services. We conclude that the controversial results reported in the litera-
ture arelikely to be the result of specification error and bias resulting from
aggregation of fee data across specialties. Our results provide evidence that
themarket for physician services may very well conform to the standards of the
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2. Studies that have used aggregate data tostudy fee setting in the physician
services market include: Feldstein (1970), Dyckman (1978), andPauly and
Satterthwajte (1980).
3. For example, perhaps two locations haveexactly the same values for all
explanatory variables except that the physician_to_population ratio is
greater in location 1. Location 1 also has a mix of specialists in which
radiologists are overrepresented relative to location 2. Onemight
reasonably expect to find a positive relation between the physician—to-
population ratioand the level of fees. This wouldoccur, but not because
physicians price to maintain a target income or becausethey possess the
ability to induce demand for their own services. Radiologists offermore
costly services than do other physicians and that would weigh theresults.
4. Evans (1974), for instance, omits the entire demandside in his model of
physician billing. Dyckman (1978) omits variablesrepresenting geographic
regions of the United States and obtains "statisticallysignificant" re—
suits that are consistent with the model of physician-induceddemand but
which reject the neoclassical predictions. That is, heestimates the
partial correlation between fees and the phys.icianto_populationratio to
be positive in a reduced-form price equation.However, when regional
dummy variables are included in his estimated model, the statistical20
significance of his results disappears and the estimated coefficient
shrinks by 33 percent.
5. One indicator of the extent of competition in a market is thenumber of
providers offering services that are substitutes for the Service in
question. The market for psychiatric services is particularlyinteresting21
in this respect. The number of visits to physician offices for psycho-
therapy has been estimated for a number of medical specialties by the
National Center for Health Statistics (1980). That office reports that
general practitioners had over 6.2 million visits for psychotherapy in
1977, while internists had 3.6 million. Psychiatrists in 1977 had 15.9
million visits for psychotherapy. These figures give the impression that
there are considerable numbers of similar services available from alter-
nate providers who are physicians.
6. Medical specialists may be complements for each other. If one specialty,
e.g., internists, often diagnoses conditions that require surgery and then
refers patients for the appropriate treatment, internists and surgeons may
be complements. In that case, an increase in the price of diagnostic
visits to an internist would decrease the number of patients making visits
to internists; the number of patients referred by internists to surgeons
might also decline. This would satisfy the conditions necessary for the
two specialists' services to be considered gross complements.
7. It was estimated by Reed (1975) that approximately 43 percent of the
population had coverage for some type of physician office visits; 37
percent of the population had some coverage for outpatient mental health
care. More important than the raw total of how many people had coverage
for each class of disorders is the nature of the coverage offered each
group. Reed also eports that in only 47 of 148 insurance plans that he
surveyed was there greater or equal coverage for mental disorders than for
physical illness treated in an outpatient setting.
8. Relying upon the mandated mental health benefits dummy variable (OUT5) and
the per—capita coverage by health insurance (LINS) makes obtaining precise
estimates of the effect of insurance difficult. Mewhouse, Phelps, and
Marquis (1980) discuss the use of a dummy variable to indicate whether or22
not an individual has insurance coverage. They point out the possibility
ofspecification errors arising from this approach. Inthis study our
marketarea isthe state; this forces us to aggregate across individuals
withdifferent coverage. We will be able to estimate effects of policy
changes such as adoption of a mandate which in thecase of mental health
insurance is likely to dominate other forms ofcoverage in most states.
Forchanges that effect the level of insurance benefits in a state, we
must implicitly assume that the individual consumer responses are
uniforrn
9.Forexample, the empirical studies of Dyckrnan (1978) and Fuchs (1978)
estimatethe coefficient representing the relationship between the
physician-to-population ratio and the fee level. Reinhardt has pointed
out that any empirical result on this relationship is consistent with the
inducement model, while only a negative parameter estimate is consistent
with the traditional model, This makes rejection of the target income
model and the inducement model difficult. However, it is possible to test
the importance of the ability to induce demand in insulating the
psychiatrist from market forces.
10. Indirect tests are necessary because, as Sloan and Feldman (1978) point
out, a positive relationship between quantity demanded and the physician—
to-population ratio is consistent with a number of theoretical formula-
tions. Increased physician density may lower time prices (e.g., travel
and waiting time); this can result in a positive relation between demand
and density. Thus, the common practice of including physician density in
the demand equation is ad hoc and leads to ambiguous results.
11. Eight regional dummy variable are included to control for unmeasured
cross—section effects in the disturbance term. Regions are used instead
of states, largely in order to gain degree of freedom for our estimates.23
However,we tested the homogeneity of the slope coefficients between the
two dummy variable specification (states and regions) and found that no
significantdifference existed. Table 2 presents variable mean and
standard deviations. Using the F test for differential sloped vectors
(Johnston 1972, P. 199), we obtained a coefficient of F78,108 = 1.04.
Therefore,we conclude that our estimates will not be altered by the use
ofthe regional dummies.
12.Several reduced form price equations were estimated and obtained negative
partial correlations between the psychiatrist-to-population ratio and fee.
Theseareavailable from the author.
12.t = (.05). t= —
1 2
andS /2+ — 2
_V/S6l 62
13. NAMCS reports the 4.4 million psychiatric visits were seen by the GP's.
14. Using a standard t test and testing for a difference between 0.96 and
1.00, we could not reject the null hypothesis that 8LPSP =1,which is
what strict competitive theorists would predict.
15. This result of BLPSP =1is not entirely surprising, given the manner Th
which the LPVIS variable is measured. The two equation partial reduced
form (LPSP endogenous) is available from the author.
16. Since our estimating equation is PS x(f (P,z)) +(1—x)PS1
the variable P in those in the vector Z must be adjusted by X in order




POP Population of state (000's) Statistic Abstract (SAB)
CPI Consumer price index by Bureau of Labor
geographic region Statistics (BLS)
PSPOP Number psychiatrists in American Medical
patient care per 1000 popula- Association (AMA)
tion
LPSP In (PSPOP)
OPSY Number office based psychi- AMA
atrists in each state
HRWK Average number hours spent in AMA/American Psycia-
private practice by psychiatrists tric Association (APA)
PVISIT Visits per capita =HRWKx OPSY)K)/ AMA
POP, where K =Aggregatevisits/hours
ratio
PLVIS In (PVISIT)
PAGE Psychiatrist mean age in years APA
AGSQ Psychiatrist mean age squared
OUT5 1 if the State has mandated Out— GLS Associates
patient insurance benefits for
treatment of mental disorders of
at least $500, 0 other,ise
PBED Number psychiatric beds per American Hospital
capita Association (AHA)
MDPOP Number non-psychiatrist AMA
physicians per 1000 population
LINS In (real health insurance ben— Health Insurance
efits paid per capita) health Association of
insurance benefits are measured America (HIAA)25
by the total value of payments
for services covered by health
insurance policies in each state
RYP In (real per capita income of the SAB
population of a state)
PCWHT Percent of population that is
white (white pop/POP)
PCAG Percent of population over 18 SAB
years of age
PCHS Percent of population having SAB
finished high school x 10
PCGOV Portion of workforce employed SAB
bygovernment.Government
employees/totalemployed
PCMAN Portion of workforce employed SAB
by manufacturing. Manufacturing
empl oyees/total employed
PSKXP In (real public school expendi— SAB
tures per capita)
REMB 1 if states have enacted a "Freedom GLS Associates
of choice" law, 0 otherwise
HBEDS Number general hospital beds AHA
per1000 population
PCMT Percent of a state's population SAB
living in an SMSA x 10
UNEM Percent of labor force unemployed BLS
x10
PCPL Applicants passing medical license AMA
examination/total applicants
NP'SP Number of medical schools AMA
per 1000 population
LFEE In (real average fee for 50 HCFA/AMA
minutes of psychotherapy by
a psychiatrist)
In Denotes natural logarithmTable 2
Means and Standard Deviations
for Selected Variables
Variable Mean Variable Mean
(S.D.) PCWT 86
RFEE 4.405 PCAG 68
(9.06) (20)
PSPOP 0.07 PCHS 66.8
(0.06) (8.94)
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